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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
rx 1 ,, Ens AL c.1.T. CREDIT , 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HI CH ARD D. NELSON, and 
JESSE E. NELSON, d/b/a HOL-
LADAY USED CARS, and RICH-
ARD D. NELSON, and JESSE E. 
N~~LSON, as individuals, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10300 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Appellant is seeking to recover against the Re-
\pondent Jesse E. Nelson for the indebtedness incurred 
!J)' the partnership, Holladay Used Cars, based on the 
:heory that Respondent Jesse E. Nelson was a partner 
ui tlie business with his son, Respondent Richard D. 
x~ison. 
3 
Appellant further contends that Respondeut .Je
1
,, 
E. Nelson executed a peronal guarantee to t]1,. 1 
. " ·~PpeJ. 
lant guaranteemg the payment of any inrlelJt i 
' Cfl!Jt;, 
that might be owed by Holladay Used Cars or Hr·. 
spondent Richard D. Nelson. · 
DISPOSITION IN LO,V:ER COURT 
The matter was set for trial, evidence and wit 
nesses ·were heard by the Court, sitting without a jury 
The Respondent Richard D. Nelson admitted that tlir 
Appellant was entitled to a judgment against him on 
all six of the causes of action set forth in the complaint 
As to the Respondent Jesse E. Nelson the Court helrl 
that there was not a partnership between the Respond· 
ents and the documents obtained from the Respondent 
Jesse E. Nelson were obtained by misrepresentation. 
The complaint as it concerns Respondent Jesse E. 
Nelson was dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks the reversal of the Order of Dis· 
missal with prejudice of no cause of action as io Rt· 
spondent Jesse E. Nelson. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is a consumer finance concern that is 1l1 
the business of financing automobile dealers at botli 
4 
,
1 
,1J10ksale and retail level. Respondent Richard D. 
\Liiun was actively engaged in selling used cars under 
;
11
f name of Holladay Used Cars, in Salt Lake County, 
l'tah It was represented to l\clr. Don Hawker, a sales 
itiiresrntatiYe of the Appellant, by Respondent Rich-
:ir~l D. Nelson that Respondent Jesse E. Nelson was 
n partnership with him, although his father would not 
an active part in the business in that he was em-
riloyed with another automobile concern. 
These representations were made to l\Ir. Don 
Hall'ker in June or July of 1962 when he contacted 
he Respondent Richard D. Nelson to solicit the Hol-
ioday l:sed Cars' finance business. Shortly thereafter, 
Jlr. Hawker contacted the Respondent Jesse E. Nelson 
and informed him of the discussions with his son con-
ttrning establishing credit lines to Holladay Used Cars. 
'! Respondeut .Jesse E. Nelson was told on this occasion 
I ':hat a personal financial statement would be required 
I 11 connection with his association with Holladay Used 
! Lars . .:\Ir. Hawker asked whether or not he was a part-
i 11n of Holladay Used Cars, and Respondent Jesse E. 
I \elson admitted he was. A couple of days later, Mr. 
! Hmker called upon the Respondent Jesse E. Nelson 
I 'nsecure his personal financial statement on the Appel-
\ !ant's form (Exhibit 5-P). On this same occasion, it was 
I >lr. Hawker's best recollection that Respondent Jesse 
I L \ elson executed Appellant's personal guarantee 
J 
11Jrm. HoweYer, subsequent developments indicate this 
j :iiuantee neYer did reach the Appellant's credit de-
1 µartnwnt. 
I 
l 
5 
The Appellant's applications and forms (F' ·1 ··. ,x JH4 
1-P through 3-P) were executed on behalf of Ii< I]. 
1 ), .11 ~· 
Used Cars by Richard D. Nelson, as partner. ' 
The Appellant's credit department in Sealtlt, 
\\T ashington, in a routine investigation found that tht 
customary guarantee form was absent from the Hni-
laday Used Car file. Mr. Hawker was requested hi 
the Appellant to secure the missing form. On Februur; 
26, 1963, Mr. Hawker contacted Respondent Jesse~: 
Nelson and secured the guarantee (Exhibit l!H\ 
Respondent Jesse E. Nelson read the guarantee and 
the contents of it was explained to him; he under· 
stood he was personally guaranteeing Holladay Use1l 
Cars and Respondent Richard D. Nelson. A copy ril 
said guarantee was given to Respondent Jesse E. Nel-
son. During this visit there was conversation by Mr. 
IIawker to the effect that the Holladay Used Car 
business was doing fine. The evidence is not clenr a) 
to whether or not this conversation took place before 
or after the execution of the guarantee. 
During July 1962 and through March 1DG3 lhr 
Appellant was floorplanning the motor vehicles fn 1 
Holladay Used Cars. It was the practice during 1:1i1 
period of time for Respondent Richard D. Nelson (,, 
appear at the Appellant's place of business and sec11rr 
the title of the motor vehicle in exchange for n Hol 
laday Used Cars bank check in the amount of the indehi· 
edness of the motor vehicle. 
Approximately two weeks after the execution iii 
6 
11
, ,puiH!ents' guarantee and particularly on ~larch 
1 ~ 11){;:1, the Appellant was informed by its bank that 
,
1
rcr:d of the Holladay Used Cars bank cheks were 
, ,
1
" 1 clearing the bank and being returned to the Appel-
: hnt'i bauk with the annotation "Refer to l\1aker." It 
.,,11 determined that the returned checks had amountecl i•l 
:
1
, approximately $12,000.00 and within a week this 
111
,Jehtedness grew to approximately $19,000.00 in in-
,11fficirnt funds checks. Demand was made by the 
lppellant on both Respondents to pay the sum of the 
niiebltdness and both ref used. 
:1TATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I 
THE TlUAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR 
\\HE~ IT FOUND THAT THE RESPOND-
EXT JESSE E. NELSON '"AS NOT A PART-
~EH WITH HIS RESPONDENT SON IN 
IIOLLADA Y USED CARS. 
ARGU.MENT 
In reYiewing the facts before us by examining the 
e~onl and the exhibits, we find that on the initial con-
:('( b~· ~Ir. Hawker of the Appellant corporation with 
l\c1pnndent Richard D. Nelson that he represented 
'li:ii Iii, father would be associated with Holladay Used 
l:ii\ as a partner. Shortly thereafter .l\Ir. Hawker 
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called upon Respondent Jesse E. Nelson and ai ,. , 
him if he was a partner in llolladav Used ('-" L : 
• • <ll s :l!1i[ 
said he was. (Tr. p. 24, 1. 21). He was also adriserl 
that be would have to furnish personal financial inf
111 
ma ti on and Respondent Jesse E. Nelson said lie . 1.1 II OIL:, 
be happy to do so (Tr. p. 24 1. 27). 
Respondent Jesse E. Nelson submitted to the 
Appellant his financial statement with his signalun 
on a form provided by the Appellant (Exhibit j.l\ 
Under the law a person is bound to know the content, 
of any written instrument which he signs and he 1, 
bound by the terms and provisions thereof. 
In applying for Appellant's floorplan accon11n11 
dations and submitting other customary forms sup· 
plied by the Appellant the Respondent Richard D. 
Nelson executed the documents as a partner (Exhibill 
1-P through 3-P). 
The exhibits and direct conversational contacts ll'itl1 
the Respondents establish the fact that the Respomlenh 
represented to the Appellant that they were partne11 
in Holladay Used Cars. 
It might be true that an actual partnership clii! 
not exist as between the Respondents but as to thin; 
persons, a partnership liability may be predicted uni 
only upon the fact of the actual creation of a partner· 
ship relation between the parties by their contrad vr 
agreement to become partners, but also upon the con 
duct and dealings of the parties under circumstanc-ri 
f l · 1 tion whcll creating the appearance o a partners up re a 
8 
·,re i1 no ;tdual eoutractual undertaking which would 
, ate :1•; bct\\'ec11 the parties themselves the status of 
11 : 1 rfw:r~liip, and eyen though they may have expressed 
1j1, 1r iu it'n t io11, unknown to such third persons, not to 
; ,,101ne partuers. 1 t may be sufficient that by their 
iti1dud tltc parties appear to become partners. See 
!ii ,\m .Tur, Partnership, Sel'.tion 71. 
The t'niJ'orm Partnership Act provides that where 
:
1 
per~o11, by words spoken or written, or by conduct, 
:q1rrsu1h himself or consents to another's representing 
;11111 to anyone as a partner in an existing partnership, 
, r 11itli 011e or more persons not actually partners, he 
,Ji:1hlc to a11y such person to whom such representation 
1:11 liee11 made who has, on the faith of such represen-
::1ti1111. gi\·en credit to the actual or apparent partner-
,111p. The TT niform Act is substantially identical to 
Sedion 48-1-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
The Uespo11dent Jesse E. Nelson became subject 
:11 ll1e liaLilities of partners ·with his son by knowingly 
dm1iling fiuancial statements directed to the Appel-
h1il and was negligent in permitting his son to hold 
:l:trnseh-es out as partners. The liability as a partner 
I ,; a person who holds himself out as a partner, or 
I 1wrmits others to do so, is predicated on the policy 
I 
I 11 tlie law seeking to preYent frauds on those who lend 
1 I heir mm ie~· on the apparent credit of those who are 
I 'di\ 01!1 as partners. Although persons mean not to 
I 
' I \1:1rt11ers :it all, and are not partners inter sese, they 
11 I 111' parl11ers notwithstanding, as to third persons. 
I 9 
I 
This liability as partners may arise contntr" t ti. 
,l 0 1Cl 1' 
own intentions. The question is not what the .. 
1
. 
pa1 It• 
intended by their contract, but whether third n , , , ·.' 
re1s11i1., 
had a right to rely on their joint credit. · 
The Appellant exercised due diliaence 1·n .1., , b '.\Ct!· 
taining the facts and had reasonable grounds for belier. 
ing that Respondent Jesse E. Nelson was a partner 
In Buehner Block Company vs. Glezos, ti Utali 
2d 226, 310 P. 2d 517, this Court reyiewed the f:icl\ 
to determine whether the evidence supported the find· 
ing of a partnership. It was held that all of the facb 
combined to provide ample basis for the finding of a 
partnership to a creditor eyen though, as between tlic 
individuals, no real partnership existed. The facts before 
this Court in our case more than abundantly support 
the fact that Respondent Jesse E. Nelson was a partner 
in that .M.r. Hawker confronted him and examined him 
as to whether or not he was a partner during their first 
meeting in July of 1962. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COl\I.MITTED ERROR 
VVHEN I'f FOUND THAT THE APPELLANT 
HAD KNO,VLEDGE OF THE INSUFFICI-
ENT FUNDS CHECKS AND "\VAS AW1\HE 
OF THE INDEBTEDNESS OF HOLLAD,\Y 
USED CARS "TI-IEN THE PERSONAL Gl"AH· 
ANTEE OF RESPONDENT JESSE E. NEL 
10 
i:S '.\'/,~ J1,XEC'UTED AND FINDING SAID 
, t'i.L'\TEE \VA.S OB'J'AINED BY l\IlS-c I . \ 
,U'rrn:,EXTATION. 
ARGUl\iENT 
:1,Ir. Hawker testified that it was the best of his 
1011 that Respondent Jesse :E.. Nelson executed 
1i:rsonal guarantee form at their first meeting in J aly 
I 
· ]9!:l. However, subsequent developments indica(ed 
11:1t it uerer got to .. Appellant's credit department (Tr. 
! ·1• I 2·1) 11 .,) ' - . 
1
1 
0n Felmiarv 2(), 1 !W3, ~Ir. Hawker secured the 
·'.tonrl persona I guarantee ( Exlub1t 5-P). It is the 
I Pi:spo11dents' eoutention that at the time the said guar-
1 ;,r1tec \\'as exeeuted that the Appellant had knowledge 
! 'I the n<H1ceou11t checks and .Mr. Hawker's represen-
·hon to Respondent Jesse E. Nelson that the Hol-
l\d Car business was doing fine was knowingly 
or made recklessly ,_,_·ithout knowing the true facts. 
1111 Trial Court agreed with this contention in dismiss-
! ,\ppellaut's complaint with no cause of action. 
Jiiss Kathleen l\IcGraw, an employee of the Ap-
duing February and l\larch of 1963, was the 
111ployc"· in eliarge of taking bank checks from Re-
'!111ndtu\ Ril'li[lrd D. N elso11 and releasing the chattel 
:1 nd de I iYering the motor vehicle titles. :Miss 
tc~titicd from the .Appellant corporate records 
the eliceks were receiYed and the dates the 
11 
titles were released. (Tr. p. 149 l. 7 through 150 I , ~ ,, 
. lu I 
All of the checks received and titles released "l ',1' ' d l!Ci 
constitutes the Respondents' indebtedness, were re-
ace leased after .March 1, 1963. The transactions took pl 
after the execution of the said personal guarantee. Sure-
ly the Appellant would not have continued to release 
the motor vehicle titles if it had known that the Hul· 
laday Used Car business was in extreme financial diffi-
culty and had knowledge that their bank checks woulr! 
not be honored. The record is completely void of am 
evidence that the Appellant had knowledge of then~­
spondents' financial difficulty on February 26, 1060. 
In Brazee vs .. Morris, 68 Ariz. 224, 204 P.2d m. 
it was held that fraud is never presumed nor can it be 
found to exist, on a mere suspicion as to possibilitir, 
thereof. Fraud must be established by clear and con-
vincing evidence. 
The burden of proving fraud rests upon the Re· 
spondents and the record is barren of any facts con-
stituting fraud on the part of the Appellant. 
It should be noted from the record (Tr. p. 103, I 
7, p. llO 1. 19) that the conversation that took place 
on February 26, 1963 between Mr. Hawker and Re-
spondent Jesse E. Nelson at the time of the executiuu 
of the said guarantee was of a general, time passing 
conversation. There is some conflict of facts in the reeord 
as to whether or not Mr. Hawker's remark that Hol-
laday Used Car businss was doing fine was made bet'nrt 
or after the execution of the said guarantee. 
12 
Tl:is raises the issue of whether or not there was 
,,li:ince IJ~· Respondent Jesse E. Nelson upon the state-
. 1t 111ade b\· l\Ir. Hawker. It appears that Respond-u1u • 
,
111 
fo~e E. Nelson relied upon the fact that his son 
iiatl already signed the guarantee (Tr. p. 102 l. 21) 
uid 11ot upon the statement made by Mr. Hawker. 
The comment made was of such a nature that it was 
111 1 reasonably calculated to deceive Respondent Jesse 
E. Xclson; it did not induce him to do that which other-
'W: lw mmld not have done. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted by the Appellant that 
'::c inwer Comt erred in dismissing the Appellant's 
1111nplaint with no cause of action. The Court committed 
:wo errors in order to reach its decisions to wit: finding 
tl1it a partnership did not exist and finding the per-
'111111 guarantee was secured by misrepresentation . 
. \ppellant submits its case on the facts as disclosed by 
1i11" rernrd and the law applicable to the issues of this 
rn1e, 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALAN D. FRANDSEN 
Attorney for Plaintif and Appellant 
366 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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